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RUSSELL SHANK 
THEGOVERNANCE OF THE United States is founded on the principle of 
individualism-a recognition of the basic rights of human beings. Prior 
to 1890, however, there was no compelling call for a sector in the law 
that recognized the “right of privacy” as one of these basic rights and the 
need to protect i t  legally. There were, of course, many elements in laws 
governing the United States that dealt with aspects of social behavior 
which might result in the loss or dimunition of an individual’s privacy, 
but they were not contained in the law under the rubric “privacy.” An 
understanding of the development of privacy in tort law may aid in 
thinking about the growing problems of dealing with the right of 
privacy, if it exists, in the new information age. 
The language of discontent seems endemic in American society. It 
led to the Revolution, and in recent years inflamed many individuals 
and groups to engage in civil disobedience, to test laws deemed averse to 
individualism and to demand legal protection in the face of actual or 
potential offensive inroads by government agencies on the individuals’ 
alleged right to be let alone. The language is strident and repeatedly 
reported in the news media. Hence it would seem unusual to think that 
the existence of a right to be let alone should ever be questioned and yet 
it has been. In part the argument is an issue of legal philosophy. In part, 
also, the issue is raised by the conflict between the proponents of the 
utility of the new computer-telecommunications technologies and 
those who fear the potential for these technologies to invade or reduce 
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personal privacy. It is difficult to shape new laws to protect that which 
we call “privacy” and not at the same time to unduly impede useful 
innovations in technology. 
Among other things, many people think that the Bill of Rights in 
the U.S. Constitution lays a clear foundation for the right of privacy. 
Yet, in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the concept of 
privacy is not explicitly stated, and the word @riuate(and any derivative 
of it) is used only once.’ The Bill of Rights does tend to enhance the 
privacy of individuals, but its provisions are directed at outlawing 
specific acts in which a government might engage that are deemed 
anathema to the republic in which we live. Together these acts aim at a 
syndrome of the invasion of privacy, but they provide no relief in law 
based on the argument of the diminution of privacy.’ It was not until 
1965 that the Supreme Court found a way to provide a constitutional 
basis for the existence of privacy as a right to be pr~tec ted .~  And i t  was 
not until 1974 that Congress recognized the right specifically i6a  law. In 
the preamble to the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress stated: 
All people are by nature free and independent, and have certain 
inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoyingand defending 
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, and happiness, and p r i ~ a c y . ~  
In ancient times privacy must have been maintained by conducting 
one’s affairs secretly. For other than the upper or citizen classes, how- 
ever, even secrecy was unnecessary-people had few rights and less 
property to preserve. To maintain status in ancient societies, one had to 
have a noble character defined according to social norms. Gossip served 
to spread the word about those who might have acted contrary to the 
norms, or who might have actually committed crimes, thus being 
subject to loss of status. There was no law against usinggossip to invade 
privacy in Roman society, nor in those societies based on it. Gossip 
could, though, be dangerous for those who engaged in it, making them 
subject to the wrath of thoseagainst whom it was used. In some societies 
gossips could be punished for being nuisances but not for being invad- 
ers of privacy. 
Secrecy was important to the individual who wished to foment 
revolution or to adopt a nonconformist religion. Again, eavesdroppers 
who reported information that others wanted to keep secret or who 
spread gossip about covert action generally did not violate any privacy 
laws. A person caught eavesdropping could be turned over to the law as 
a trespasser or a common nuisance but not as a thief of privacy. The 
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crime of eavesdropping became part of English law in the fourteenth 
century and was part of the common law of the colonies thereafter.5 
Through the centuries to modern times one can easily recall both 
the movements aimed at improving or preserving the rights of human 
beings and the wars and inquisitions that were waged with individual 
rights at their core. Yet the right to privacy was generally not one of 
them, except as it might be inferred from the manner in which theother 
rights were to be protected. The English Parliament presented a bill of 
rights to King William and Queen Mary in 1689. It stands with the 
Magna Carta as the cornerstone of English liberty. Among other things, 
i t  referred to true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the 
people. The French have included a declaration of the rights of man and 
citizens in their constitutions since 1789, guaranteeing the freedoms of 
speech, religion, and the press and personal security. The right of 
privacy is implicit in these rights. None of these proclamations pre- 
vented individuals and groups from discriminating against those who 
chose certain religions and political beliefs, but, in the broadest sense, 
these discriminations were not illegal. The fact that they existed gave 
emphasis to the need some felt to keep their personal lives private. 
The concept of privacy as something which could be given value 
for which someone could be compensated if one suffered its invasion, 
violation, or destruction has grown slowly in the United States as a 
consequence of the growth of the institutions and devices of communi-
cations. From message and postal systems that existed before the Revo- 
lution to the computer-telecommunication technology of modern 
times, society’s need for laws protecting the sanctuary of the individual 
has been directly proportional to the complexity of the communication 
systems of the times. 
During the first century of the American Republic, society was not 
so complex that a legal concept of privacy in tort law was deemed 
essential. This is not to say that people were unconcerned about others 
prying into their lives. There was just no compelling interest to seek 
recompense for the intrusion unless, of course, something of property 
value was stolen, or a life endangered, or a home invaded in the process. 
And then the laws of theft, battery, and mayhem could be invoked. 
The potential for eroding privacy by entrusting one’s messages to 
the mails was noted in the earliest days of colonial times in America. 
Governor Bradford of the Pilgrim group in Massachusetts intercepted 
letters of disgruntled settlers and accused the writers of slander and false 
accusations. Benjamin Franklin assumed that his mail was being 
opened even though he forbade the employees of his postal service from 
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opening bags of mail. The first law establishing a postal service con- 
tained language that made it illegal to intercept, read, or destroy mail 
entrusted to it. This prohibition has been repeated in subsequent legis- 
lation concerning the postal service. Most people who use the mail now 
assume that no one intercepts and reads their letters.6 
The census, required by the Constitution in order to determine the 
size of Congress, is another function that many have believed is an 
ominous device by which the government can invade privacy. It was at 
first most notably a political device and was viewed with suspicion in 
the eyes of proponents of states’ rights. As the country grew in all 
dimensions, proposals for adding questions relating to manufactures, 
other elements of economics, and personal characteristics of the people 
have been made. Those in charge of the census have sought to assuage 
the fear of the invasion of privacy. For example, the following language 
appeared in the circular of the census in 1840: 
Objections, it has been suggested, may possibly arise on  the part of 
some persons to give the statistical information required by theact, 
upon the ground of disinclination to expose their private affairs. 
Such, however, is not the intent, nor can be the effect, of answering 
ingenuously, the interrogatories. On  the statistical tables no name 
is inserted-the figures stand opposite no man’s name; and there- 
fore the objection can not apply. It is, moreover, inculcated upon 
the assistant that he consider all communications made to him in 
the performance of his duty, relative to the business of the people, as 
strictly ~onf ident ia l .~  
Still, objections to questions in the census prevail. In the latest 
census i t  was considered an invasion of privacy to count the number of 
bathrooms in residences. It is most appropriate to this current essay to 
note that the intensity of the federal government’s data gathering in the 
census has only increased, partly due to the innovations in tabulations 
that began in the late nineteenth century when Hollerith used his punch 
card innovation to handle the vast array of statistics being gathered.8 
Now that the census data exists in machine-readable form, the census 
has entered the arena of argument about the impact of the computer on 
society. The Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is pro- 
moting the use of commercial agencies to disseminate government data. 
The Census Bureau is thus faced with a conflict. Its data are filed in its 
CENDATA computer database. Two commercial agencies have asked 
for access to the file in order to offer public services. “Given its pledge to 
compile information confidentially, the agency is sensitive to allowing 
end-user access directly to a government computer, and does not want 
even a perception of anyone being able to dial up private in f~ rma t ion . ”~  
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The potential for the invasion of privacy increased with the inven- 
tion of telegraphy. Furthermore, whereas formerly the government was 
the villain people wished to restrain, now private industry was in a 
position to be suspect also. In the Civil War and during the impeach- 
ment deliberations over President Johnson, the government sought and 
received enormous quantities of copies of old telegrams. Moreover, in 
order to examine the questions of irregularities in elections in the 
various states, Congress sought more. Western Union’s own regulations 
forbade its employees from divulging information in telegrams. Its rule 
was: 
All messages whatsoever-including Press Reports, are strictly pri- 
vate and confidential, and must be thus treated by employees of this 
Company. Information must in no case be given to persons not clearly 
entitled to receive it, concerning any message passed or desi ned to6pass over the wires or through the offices of this Company. 
In this manner, a private industry had attempted to extend the restric- 
tions of the government to its own employees. 
Through much of the nineteenth century, the legal philosophers 
paid more attention to the need to administer a system that was based on 
the notion that people were constantly threatened by the government 
while at the same time they tried to sustain the notion that in this nation 
such a threat did not exist. An influential writer of the time, Thomas 
Cooley, said i t  was a matter of principle that “it is better oftentimes that 
crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to 
have his premises invaded, his trunks broken open, his private books, 
papers, and letters exposed to prying curiosity .... 11 
American society changed rapidly following the Civil War. At the 
same time that people were moving into new territories the cities were 
growing. In the West a person was both more visible because of the 
sparse population and more able to move on to escape a bad reputation. 
In the cities people needed privacy more because of the crowds but 
gained it easier through anonymity. As individuals came to need more 
privacy i t  gained value. 
Slowly an aura of the concept of privacy’s value spread in American 
society. More people learned to read and this led to the impact of another 
“device” on the notion of the value of privacy-that was “yellow jour- 
nalism.” It was fostered by the urge of entrepreneurs to sell newspapers 
to the growing reading public.’2 In earlier days the newspaper was a 
medium for reporting events and political opinion. Now a portion of 
the press turned to sensationalism to increase sales. By the late 1800sthe 
phenomenon of reporting personal items in spicy language attracted 
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essayists of great visibility to urge reform. One writer noted that: “A 
man’s private life is inviolably his own ....None should cross his thresh- 
old. Therein is the sanctum of privacy, the violation of whose rights is 
~acrilege.”’~The President of the University of Wisconsin called for new 
defenses to be set up on behalf of the individual to protect the individual 
from the press because it was “breaking in on many of the amenities of 
social life, and scattering as news things of private interest only and of 
dear personal c~ncern .” ’~  Without new laws an individual could only 
attach social discredit to invasions of privacy on the part of the press.15 
Finally the recognition of a right to privacy, the violation of which 
could be made the subject of suit in court, was argued by two young 
lawyers in Boston-Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. Their 
article in the Hanlard Law Reuiew argued that the individual had a 
right to be let alone.16 That set the course for the passing of privacy laws 
in the states for the next ninety years. 
As it developed, four aspects of damage from the invasion of privacy 
have been recognized: 
-intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his pri- 
vate affairs; 
-public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 
-publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
-appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff‘s name 
or 1ikene~s.I~ 
Many have argued that Warren-Brandeis contained false assump- 
tions or exaggerations. The literature of the examination of the right to 
be let alone is extensive with many authors setting forth their own 
reworking of the definitions. Still, by 1982 a right of privacy of some 
dimension was recognized in forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia.” One influential author, William Prosser, argues away 
most of the torts growing from Warren-Brandeis. Nevertheless, he notes 
that the laws are not wrong: they have resulted from public demand. 
They have grown without plan, however, and i t  may be time to call a 
halt to their pas~age.’~ 
It was not the Warren-Brandeis article alone which impelled the 
public to push for privacy legislation. Innovations in the devices of 
communication increased the fear that government agents could learn 
things about the individual and use them to discomfort or harm people 
even though there might not be actual evidence of such action. The 
American’s penchant for keeping one’s counsel and remaining private 
grew stronger when faced with the possibility of the degradation of these 
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characteristics. Without doubt, this fear, though seemingly irrational, 
has often led lawmakers to err on the side of individualism and privacy 
in advance of damage. Many cases were to be brought to court: space 
here does not allow discussion of their variations. No one was guaran- 
teed complete privacy by the law, but: 
The general policy prevailed that information about a person 
belonged under his control until society could show an overriding 
need for its disclosure. The right to privacy was emphatically a right 
of the individual as it entered the body of American law at the close of 
the nineteenth century.'' 
Legal innovations have not been rapid. With the microphone, 
invented in 1889, government agents and police could engage in eaves- 
dropping without being on the premises of suspected wrongdoers.21 
Wiretapping and bugging of rooms were the tools of thedetective trade. 
And soon the arguments began: if one's premises were not invaded and 
no mail, no telegram, or no message had been stolen, had one lost 
something of value? These questions became more poignant particu- 
larly if one were engaged in criminal activity. In a landmark case in 1928 
the Supreme Court ruled that electronic communications were not 
tangible enough to be seizable unless they were seized on a person's 
property in which case the action would then be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment." One of the dissenters on the Court was Justice Louis 
Brandeis! 
This was an important but not a definitive case. It is the character of 
legal proceedings that each case might present some special circum- 
stances. Hence, while appearing to be similar to a previous case, a new 
case might truly be without precedent. Furthermore, one of the variations 
might consist of the mechanism for the alleged violation of a right of 
privacy. Through the first sixty years of the twentieth century the 
conflict between the issues of the individual's right to know and his or 
her right to be let alone have been exacerbated by continued innovations 
in communcation and the law to deal with them. Old laws have been 
strained to cover new technologies. When telegraphy was added tomail, 
could old regulations about learning something from the content of an 
illegally opened letter be applied to telegrams? Can something learned 
through a phone tap miles from the room in which a word was spoken 
be controlled by laws against stealing letters? Law was strained when 
messages began to be sent over the air by radio and not contained within 
a wire. Government agents are constrained by law from opening a 
traditional letter or eavesdropping on a telephone call. There is no law 
yet against someone reading someone else's electronic mail. 
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In Detroit a federal grand jury, investigating an alleged drug dealer, 
subpoenaed an electronic mail operator for “printouts of any and all 
records, data, documents, or electronic mail about the suspect, his 
associates and their business operation^."'^ The company claimed that 
the information was privileged under the law and refused to give i t  out. 
The court never acted on the company’s claim, however, because an 
indictment was issued without the information. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has only recently ruled that information gleaned from 
listening to cordless phone messages could be used to convict a drug 
dealer even though the police had not obtained permission to tap the 
communication. The court reasoned that where there was no wire there 
had been no wiretap, hence no warrant was required. “When Congress 
put limits on eavesdropping, the judges held, it didn’t have the cordless 
phone in mind. ”“Society is faced wi th two extraordinarily complicated 
sets of issues-is there a “right to be let alone,” and when is it violated? 
The dilemma for society lies in determining how i t  should promote the 
innovation of new communications technology while not finding itself 
faced with an unrecognized capability in the technology for breaching 
the legal barriers against the invasion of privacy. 
The Communications Act of 1934 brought together a number of 
laws relating to the telephone and radio and created the Federal Com- 
munications Commission (FCC) to establish regulations that would 
protect the communications industry while preserving the rights of the 
people. The law for radio was thus extended to telegraphy and the 
telephone as the FCC was given jurisdiction over them all including a 
penalty for the unauthorized interception and divulgence of wire 
25
messages. 
Now we are faced with a much more sophisticated technological 
environment, that of the computer-communication combination con- 
trolled by the microscopic integrated circuit. The FCC early forbade the 
telephone companies from offering computer services, even though 
computers came to be essential to the operation of the telephone net- 
work in the United States. Furthermore, the phone companies would 
not allow manufacturers of electronic equipment to sell their products 
to the public for unattended attachment to the phone lines. The Carter-
fone decision by the FCC broke the barrier against “foreign” attach- 
ments to the phone system. Then value-added networks and bulk 
resellers of phone lines spawned the forces which have led to the dis- 
memberment of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT8cT). The current national mood, also, is instrumental in reducing 
the authority of the FCC in many areas as the forces of the marketplace 
replace government intervention. 
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The specter of the remote agent gaining access to a computer data 
bank containing information about an individual and linking i t  with 
other data banks to create an invisible, virtual, and insidious file on an 
individual began to rise in the 1960s. The government was forced by 
public demand to drop its attempt to create a Federal Data Center 
although the courts did uphold the use of computers to cross-check the 
earnings of recipients of government benefits. 26 
The social environment of consumerism, individualism, and com- 
puters collided in the 1960s. Computers were gaining wide acceptance 
for the storage and manipulation of credit information: individuals 
demanded and got a credit law which gives them access to data about 
themselves and the means for correcting improper records.27 In the same 
year (1968) the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, however, 
only gave protection to oral communications transmitted by wire.28 
Other potentially troublesome technologies were yet to be introduced 
into the marketplace. It wasn’t until 1974 that the Privacy Act was 
passed regulating the federal government in keeping and providing 
access to records. The explosion of communications technology is now 
rapidly outpacing the law. 
Legislated policy is ambiguous, incomplete or nonexistent with 
regard to a number of technological innovations, among them: dig- 
itally transmitted telephone conversations, calls on cellular or cord-
less phones, data communication between computers, electronic 
mail, database surveillance, pen registers, closed circuit television and 
electronic beepers.29 
Of 142 federal agencies surveyed, 25 percent use or plan to use electronic 
surveillance. The extent of the private sector’s use of electronic surveil- 
lance is unknown.30 
One important part of the Privacy Act was the creation of a Privacy 
Protection Study Commission. It examined individual privacy rights 
and record-keeping practices in many environments, including the 
private sector. The commission’s report made many recommendations 
for federal and state governments for laws and practices to protect the 
privacy of the individual. Perhaps its enduring contribution, however, 
is the conclusion that an effective privacy protection policy must have 
three concurrent objectives: 
-to create a proper balance between what an individual is expected to 
divulge to a record-keeping organization and what he seeks in re- 
turn (tominimize intrusiveness); 
-to open up record-keeping organizations in ways that will mini- 
mize the extent to which recorded information about an individual 
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is itself a source of unfairness in any decision about him made on 
the basis of it ( t o  max imize  fairness); and 
-to create and define obligations with respect to the uses and dis- 
closures that will be made of recorded information about a n  indi- 
vidual t o  create legitimate, enforceable expectations of confiden-t,tiality ). 
Not all students of the problems of legislating privacy in the 
modern world are sanguine about achieving these objectives. Some 
social ideals cannot be translated into intelligible legal theory. “Some 
elude legal resolution because we cannot clearly identify and balance 
the relevant social and moral values; and we refuse to resolve some 
human problems by law because we are unwilling to bear the cost that 
legal solutions would impose.”32 But too much is at stake for both the 
individual and the communication industries: law is required to pre-
vent anarchy, a state in which the individual’s rights would be lost. 
Ithiel de Sola Pool’s closing comments in his last book contain the 
most optimistic view: 
The easy access, low cost, and distributed intelligence of modern 
means of communication are a prime reason for hope. The  demo- 
cratic impulse to regulate evils, as Tccqueville warned, is ironically a 
reason for worry. Lack of technical grasp by policy makers and their 
propensity to solve problems of conflict, privacy, intellectual prop- 
erty, and monopoly by accustomed bureaucratic routines are the main 
reasons for concern. But as long as the First Amendment stands, 
backed by courts which take it seriously, the loss of liberty is not 
foreordained. The  commitment of American culture to pluralism and 
individual rights is reason for optimism, as is the pliancy and profu-
sion of electronic technology. 33 
Americans hold dear both individualism and freedom from govern- 
ment invasion of their private lives. Their laws and court proceedings 
reflect these values and governmental institutions do  change, if slowly, 
as a result of societal pressures. Even if the Constitution does not 
recognize privacy, it embodies a system that can sustain this right. But 
the future is far from clear: 
As the United States becomes moreeconomically, socially, and ppliti- 
cally information-oriented, personal privacy promises to became a 
matter of increasing litigation, legislation, and political concern. 
Indeed, the political ideal of privacy is destined to increase rather than 
lessen in importance within the polity.= 
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